

A SELECTIVE, ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON CURRENT SOUTH ASIAN ISSUES

A Report Prepared under an Interagency Agreement
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DEC 1985

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A SELECTIVE, ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON CURRENT SOUTH ASIAN ISSUES

December 1985

Author: Elizabeth R. Curtiss

PREFACE

This bibliography provides selective annotations of open-source material on two current issues in South Asia:

- nuclear developments in South Asia, and
- tactics and organization of Afghan resistance groups.

The bibliography incorporates serials and monographs received in November 1985 and is the seventh in a series on these subjects.

Entries are arranged alphabetically by author or title. Library of Congress call numbers, where appropriate, are included to facilitate the recovery of source material.

CONTENTS

GLOSSARY- NUCLEAR TERMINOLOGY RELATING TO SOUTH ASIA

AEMC	The Atomic Energy Minerals Center at Lahore has responsibility for the location and exploitation of Pakistan's uranium ore, and fills a vital need stemming from boycotts of Pakistan by international nuclear fuel suppliers.
BARC	Bhabba Atomic Research Centre, located in north Bombay, is India's facility for research, experimentation, and development of nuclear technology.
CHASHNUPP	Pakistan's Chashma Nuclear Power Plant, a projected 900-megawatt facility in Mianwali District, Punjab, was sanctioned in 1982 in order to create electrical power through light-water technology.
Cirus	A Candu-type Canadian-built plant located at BARC, Cirus was commissioned in 1960. India reprocessed spent fuel from Cirus to make the plutonium for its 1974 "peaceful nuclear explosion;" Cirus has a capacity of 40 megawatts.
Dhruva	One of the world's few high-flux reactors, Dhruva, which went critical in August 1985, is solely the product of Indian research and production and falls completely outside IAEA safeguards. Dhruva shares facilities with Cirus, its neighbor in the BARC, has a 100 megawatt capacity, and can produce 30 kg of plutonium annually.
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency (United Nations)
Kalpakkam	This Tamil Nadu town is the site of the Madras Atomic Power Project and gives its name to a 40-megawatt fast breeder reactor which went critical in August 1985 using plutonium-uranium carbide fuel.

GLOSSARY- SOVIET AND SOUTH ASIAN TERMINOLOGY RELATING TO THE CONFLICT IN AFGHANISTAN

Commander — A resistance fighter who is recognized as a military leader in local or regional areas of conflict; some commanders are respected outside their own regions, but there is not yet a coordinated nationwide command.

Dushmani — (singular: dushman.) Soviet perjorative term for Afghan insurgents; the term means "bandit" and was originated during the 1930s Central Asian resistance.

DRA — The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan was established by a coup in April 1978, but controls only small parts of Afghan territory, mostly concentrated along the major highway, airbases, and military installations, and in some urban centers, including Kabul---none of them secure from resistance guerilla operations.

KHAD — DRA intelligence service whose operations are entirely directed by its many Soviet KGB advisors.

Mujahideen — (singular: mujahid.) This Islamic term means "holy warrior", but is often used as a name for the Afghan resistance, who consider their fight a traditional Islamic jihad holy war) to drive unbelievers from an Islamic country.

SPETZNAZ — Soviet special warfare troops under the GRU (Military Intelligence Directorate) of the Soviet Ministry of Defense; these units are deployed throughout Afghanistan on a highly mobile basis for operations which require more skill or loyalty than can be obtained from regular Soviet or DRA troops.

KANUPP	Karachi Nuclear Power Plant, a 125 megawatt reactor, was supplied by Canada on a turnkey basis and became operational in 1972.
MAPP-1	Madras Atomic Power Project's first Candu-type 235-megawatt unit was commissioned in January 1984. The center is located at Kalpakkam, Tamil Nadu, and is fully indigenous; consequently, its units and the plutonium they produce fall outside IAEA inspection safeguards. MAPP units are intended to provide electricty for Madras.
MAPP-2	The second unit at Madras Atomic Power Project is also a Candu-type 235-megawatt plutonium and heavy-water reactor. MAPP-2 went critical in August 1985 and was commissioned in October of the same year.
NPT	The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, ratified by the UN General Assembly in 1968. India and Pakistan contend the NPT discriminates against non-nuclear states, but Pakistan has repeatedly offered to sign if India will do so simultaneously. Islamabad voted in favor of UNGA ratification of the NPT.
PAEC	Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission
PINSTECH	Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science Technology, the site of a US-supplied 5-megawatt "swimming pool"-type reactor installed in the 1960s
Tharapur	The Tharapur nuclear power plant, near Bombay, was built by the US, has a capacity of 600 megawatts, and can annually produce 50 to 80 kg of plutonium; Tharapur and its products come under IAEA inspection safeguards.

1. NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH ASIA

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ON CURRENT SOUTH ASIAN ISSUES
December 1985

Bhatia, Anita "India's Space Program: Cause for Concern?" Asian Survey, (Berkeley), vol. XXV, no. 10, October 1985, p. 1013. DS1.A496

Bhatia gives a comprehensive overview of India's space program and discusses its possible security uses, noting that space missiles can carry nuclear charges. India has been working with an old US missile launcher, the Scout, which is capable of launching small payloads. "When converted for launch on a ballistic trajectory, the Scout's range is 500 miles with a 1000-lb payload. Thus the SLV-3 can be converted into an IRBM by replacing the fourth stage and the payload satellite with a 880-lb warhead, and could be fired up to a distance of 5,000 km by adding enough punch in the rocket's three stages." India is also attempting to build even more powerful launch vehicles, as well as to develop the heat shields necessary to raise its missiles to an intercontinental range. Another subject of intended indigenous Indian research is improvement of the velocity of gas muzzles, which can be used to increase thrust for delivery systems. New Delhi has been careful to delink its satellite and space launch programs, probably to avoid delays in one due to technological dependence on the other. These and additional factors, all clearly and carefully elucidated in this vital article, present undeniable evidence that India intends to develop a space program for security uses.

"Denial of N[uclear] Technology to 3rd World Not Wise." Muslim, (Islamabad), 2 October 1985, p. 8.

Munir Ahmad, Chairman of the PAEC, represented Pakistan at the 29th regular session of the IAEA's General Conference, held in Vienna in late September. Ahmad asserted that Pakistan had consistently supported the strengthening of nuclear non-proliferation regimes, particularly through the establishment of "nuclear free zones" in various regions. Pakistan has also backed agency safeguard systems, although their application was currently discriminatory. However, the superpowers, without doing anything to limit their own vertical proliferation, were using non-proliferation rhetoric to deny Third World nations the technology for nuclear energy. Many of these

nations, such as Pakistan, must have nuclear energy in order to achieve economic development. These nuclear power plants pose no threat whatsover to world safety, and the recipient states of the Third World are not willing to accept a permanent state of under-development in peaceful nuclear technology. Pakistan was distressed to note that of 34 new nuclear power plants in 13 countries during the last year, the largest annual increase since the early 1970s, not one was in a developing country. However, these countries were increasing their indigenous nuclear skills and would eventually be able to produce their own nuclear power plants.

"Dhruva Not for Producing Bomb-Grade Plutonium." Statesman, (Calcutta), 11 August 1985, p. 7.

A "highly-placed source at the Bhabba Atomic Research Centre, which has designed and produced the totally-indigenous Dhruva plant, ridicules the idea that the new plant will be used to produce plutonium for a bomb. A 100-MW capacity plant puts out only 30 kg of the substance, rather than the 300 kg which has been mentioned in the press. Even the Tharapur atomic power plants, which combine to a capacity of 600 MW capacity [sic], produce only 50 to 80 kg of plutonium per year. Moreover, plutonium has many uses aside from nuclear explosions. Dhruva is one of the few high-flux neutron reactors in the world, and will produce several isotopes, including molybdenum-99 and iodine-125. The scientist says that Dhruva is most notable as an addition to India's nuclear research program."

Gauhar, Altaf. "Who Wants the Bomb?" and "Superpower Duplicity." Muslim, (Islamabad), 22 September 1985, p. 4, and 24 September 1985, p. 4 (respectively).

In this two-part discussion of a recent conference in Geneva reviewing the status and impact of the NPT, Gauhar argues that the two superpowers have abandoned the idea of vertical arms control, becoming obsessed instead with full possession of any weapons technology available. Although

he faults the arrogance of US delegate Richard Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security Policy, he also chides the USSR for preferring military power over diplomatic integrity. Gauhar argues that with the availability of technological means of verification, there is no longer any merit to the superpower myth that the other superpower's compliance cannot be trusted. The only reason for delay on a Moscow-Washington arms agreement is lack of commitment by either superpower to restraint on its own already-overfilled arsenal. In such an environment a small nation is unlikely to be respected by Moscow or Washington unless that nation itself joins the nuclear club.

Hussain, Mushahid. "No Indian Plan to Attack Kahuta: Subramanyam." Muslim, (Islamabad), 5 November 1985, p. 1

Speaking at the opening session of the International Seminar on Regional Security in South Asia, at the Centre for Nepal and Asian Studies in Kathmandu, one of India's most prominent foreign policy specialists stated that India had no plans to stage a surgical strike against Pakistan's Kahuta nuclear facility, since that would invite retaliation by Islamabad against Indian installations outside Bombay. C. Subramanyam said that attacks against Pakistan would come only from "the Americans, or their friends, the Israelis." The placement of Pakistan's main nuclear complex only 70 miles from the Indian border indicates that the late Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was more afraid of attack by Israel than by India. Subramanyam favored the nuclearization of South Asia, concluding that "if a nuclear bomb is safe in the hands of a drunken Nixon, a senile Mao, or a comatose Brezhnev, then it's quite safe in the hands of General Zia-ul-Haq and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi." Subramanyam said he has no doubt that "Pakistan has the bomb or is making one."

"India Fires Up Nuclear Reactor, May Produce Weapons Plutonium." Asian Wall Street Journal, (Hong Kong), 9 August 1985, p. 3.

The Dhruva plant outside Bombay, the world's largest research reactor, will gradually replace the Canadian-built Cirus reactor, which began operation in 1974. Production at Dhruva will begin in November, serving the agricultural, medical, and industrial sectors. India will also commission its first fast-breeder test reactor in September 1985, thereby becoming the first country to use plutonium-uranium fuel in a nuclear plant. A third nuclear reactor, a 235 MW unit in the Madras station, begins functioning at the end of August. The US-built Tharapur station near Bombay and the Rajasthan state reactors, which use Soviet-supplied heavy water, remain the only Indian nuclear facilities subject to IAEA inspection safeguards.

"India Rejects Proposal for Nuclear Accord." Asian Wall Street Journal, (Hong Kong), 19 September 1985, p. 19.

Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi has reiterated India's commitment to abstain from building nuclear weapons, but rejected a US proposal for a nuclear agreement with Pakistan. Instead, he urged Washington to use its influence over Islamabad to obtain a similar commitment from Pakistani officials. The announcement follows a visit to South Asia by two US officials seeking to establish a regional approach to nonproliferation.

"India Starts Up a New Nuclear Reactor." Asian Wall Street Journal, (Hong Kong), 13 August 1985, p. 13.

Indian nuclear power engineers have begun operation of a $106 million, 235-MW atomic power reactor in the Madras station. The new plant, a MAPP-2, is the only electricity-producing plant in India which falls outside international safeguards. The plant is patterned on the Canadian Candu design using natural uranium fuel and heavy water; the reactor has stainless steel ends to prevent leaks. Spent fuel from MAPP-2 will be reprocessed to yield plutonium. Customers in Madras will begin receiving electricity from the new plant in December. Indian engineers are building two more Candu-style plants, one

each in Uttar Pradesh and Gujarat. Indian scientists have also recently tested a plutonium-uranium carbide fuel for a fast-breeder reactor.

"India's Plutonium Production Ability to Soar with Unsafeguarded Reactor." Nucleonics Week, (New York), 15 August 1985, p. 1. HD9698.A1N8

India's Dhruva ("Northern Star") reactor attained criticality in mid-August, seven months behind schedule. Although the reactor will be used primarily for research and experimentation, it will produce plutonium which is not subject to international safeguards, because Dhruva was completely designed and built by Indians. Dhruva has two in-pile loops for test irradiation of fuel assemblies and other reactor materials, and will produce such isotopes as iodine-131, iodine-125, chromium-51, and molybdenum-99. Officials said that all the plutonium Dhruva is scheduled to produce has already been committed to research projects. MAPP-2 also went critical in mid-August, to be commissioned in October, while the Kalapakkam plant will go critical in October. These two plants are not safeguarded. [This article explains several other recent Indian reactors; most of that information can be found in the GLOSSARY.]

Junaid, Ahmad Abu "Soviet Suitor on Sidelines as Washington Woos Rajiv." Arabia, (London), August 1985, p. 26.

The May 1985 visit to India of US Commerce Secretary Malcolm Baldridge resulted in the signing of a technology transfer agreement under which India was allowed to acquire highly sophisticated dual-purpose American computers and technology for telecommunications, laser weaponry, and sensitive military hardware. Later visits by Rajiv Gandhi to US Defense Department officials, including Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, resulted in permission to purchase even more sophisticated equipment. The main US concern voiced at these meetings centered around fear that India would leak technological information to close associates in the Soviet Union. The

sales indicate that the US considers India not only the major regional power in South Asia, but a probable dominant factor in the global balance in the next decade, possibly even able to replace America's former Indian Ocean lynchpin, the Shah of Iran. [Continuation of this shift in Washington's attitude could lead Congress to increase its pressure against nuclear development in Pakistan, at the same time that Indian engineers and scientists upgrade their research tools sufficiently to refine delivery, detonation, and detection technologies for application to their own nuclear program.]

Khan, A. Q. "The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty at Crossroads." Muslim Magazine, (Islamabad), 13 September 1985, p. 4.

Pakistan's top nuclear scientist lists the reasons the NPT has lost its credibility, dwelling on its extensive differentiation between states which have and have not attained nuclear weapons status, and between those which have and have not signed the treaty. This article also reproduces the text of the treaty in full.

"Kuwait Paper on Nuclear Cooperation with Egypt." Federal Broadcast Information Service (South Asia), 15 November 1985, p. F4.

Egypt and Pakistan will soon begin cooperation to develop nuclear research and share acquired nuclear technology. Informed Egyptian sources spoke to the Kuwaiti newspaper Federal Broadcast Information Service (South Asia) tian President Hosni Mubarak and Pakistani President Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq. The sources explained that the two presidents had agreed to establish a means of exchanging Pakistani expertise in the field of fuel enrichment of nuclear elements for Egyptian expertise in the practical uses of nuclear enrichments.

Martin, Michael. Afghanistan: Inside a Rebel Stronghold, Poole, Dorset (UK): Blandford Press, 1985.

The author travelled behind Afghan resistance lines for four months in 1983. Under the sponsorship of the fundamentalist Hezb-Islami of Gulbaddin Hekmatyar, a group generally avoided by Western journalists, he toured the eastern part of the country from the war-ravaged villages near Kabul to the more tranquil Bamyan Valley. He notes that the force of Islam is the backbone of the anticommunist resistance, but that the insurgent groups expend considerable effort feuding and exacting vengeance upon one another. He illustrates the surreal aspects of the conflict through the juxtaposition of traditional Afghan mores with the lethality of modern warfare: the author and his insurgent hosts, for instance, eat a meal insouciantly while bullets chip away the building they occupy. In another example, an 80-year-old Afghan patriarch, offers to join the jihad against the Soviet-dominated regime to replace his son, who has just been killed in action. In depicting the indominability and stubborn resistance of the Afghan insurgents, Martin's account is among the best available today.

Mishra, Kamalakar. "A Successful Swadeshi [Domestically-Produced] Nuclear Industry." Telegraph, (Calcutta), 5 August 1985.

Through a combination of good fortune in geography and perseverance in engineering, India possesses a full range of nuclear fuels. Known deposits of thorium exceed 360,000 tons, and known deposits or uranium come to 70,000 tons at most. When considered as fuels for electrical energy production, these reserves far exceed the value of coal. However, because India's current nuclear energy technology does not use uranium efficiently, the best potential fuel-output ratios are most likely to come from thorium-based technologies. The largest drawback facing India's nuclear energy program is lack of a strong interdepartmental regulatory agency independent of the government, which could assess, monitor, and lay down mandatory norms and guidelines on the environmental and

safety aspects of the program. The Indian public must be firmly assured that they will not experience a nuclear Bhopal.

Morello, Ted. "Nuclear Inspection? Yes." Far Eastern Economic Review, (Hong Kong), 24 October 1985, p. 40. HC411.F18

President Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq of Pakistan, in an interview with Asia's top news magazine, says that even the research facilities at Kahuta would be included under a mutual inspection nuclear agreement with India. Zia also denies that Pakistan has nuclear cooperation with China or that Chinese scientists work at Kahuta.

"No Move to Drop Chashma Nuclear Power Project." Muslim, (Islamabad), 20 October 1985, p. 3.

During Question Hour on 1 October, a member of the National Assemby suggested that the long-delayed Chashma Nuclear Power Project would be dropped because of pressure from a superpower. In reply, the Parliamentary Secretary for Finance and Planning, Choudhry Nisar Ali Khan, said that tenders for the project were floated in December 1982, but the plant had become a political issue among various countries and no bids were received. It was therefore difficult to say when the project would be completed. However, discussions were in progress with several companies and their governments. A French company had been involved with early design consultations, but had withdrawn its participation under pressure from the French government. Pakistan is "in touch with French authorities regarding the non-fulfillment of bilateral commitments by France."

"Nuclear Analysts Respond to Pakistani's Letter." Telegraph, (Calcutta), 28 August 1985, p. 4.

Indian analysts respond to a letter which Pakistan's nuclear scientist, Dr.A.Q. Khan, submitted to the

Pakistani newspaper, Muslim. [For information on this letter see the bibliography for October 1985.] The responding analysts point out that Khan's letter states "We do not differentiate between a device and a bomb." The letter also asserts that India has never accepted the existence of Pakistan. Khan's contentions, whether separately or together, suggest that one or more Pakistanis with major influence over Islamabad's nuclear program believe that India possesses both the desire to annihilate Pakistan and the capability of doing so through nuclear technology.

"Plan Drawn Up to Produce 13,000 T[ons] Heavy Water." Financial Express, (New Delhi), 8 August 1985.

In order to meet the century-end goal of 10,000 MW of power generation, India's Department of Atomic Energy has drawn up plans for producing 13,000 tons of heavy water. More plants will be built to use the monothermal ammonia hydrogen exchange process, with synthesis gas from fertiliser plants as feed. There will also be one or two "independent monothermal ammonia hydrogen exhange process plants with water ammonia exchange as front end [sic] and at least one 400-ton a year heavy water plant, based on hydrogen sulphide water exchange." In the immediate future, one more 110-ton heavy water plant identical to the Thal plant has been proposed for Gujarat state. Successful trials in water exchange technology at the Baroda power plant encourage further design work for a heavy water plant based on ammonia hydrogen exchange independent of fertiliser plants. Baroda is now working at 80 percent effective capacity and its stream factor has improved. The goal of delinking heavy water from fertiliser plants is vital, because malfunction in the latter harm the entire system.

"Russia Is Firm on IAEA N-Control." Times of India, (Bombay), 30 August 1985.

A representative of the Soviet Foreign Office declares that the Soviet Union "'does not make exceptions' to the

rule that non-nuclear weapons states should place under the control of the IAEA all nuclear material acquired with Soviet assistance." The Soviet Union had offered India two options for additional nuclear assistance when Prime Minister Indira Gandhi visited Moscow in September 1982. However, when her successor, Rajiv Gandhi, visited Moscow in 1985, the topic was not raised, allegedly because of disagreement over IAEA inspection. Only a "top-level" political decision could resolve the impasse. New Delhi contends that because China, a nuclear weapons state, need not submit its Soviet-assisted nuclear technology to IAEA inspection, Moscow is practicing discrimination against non-nuclear weapons states such as India. The Soviet statement reiterates the importance which Moscow attaches to the NPT.

Siddiqi, Nafees "US Tilt Toward India: Implications for Pakistan." Muslim, (Islamabad), 13 October 1985, p. 4.

This emotional article lists several signs pointing toward an American "tilt" toward India: articles by well-placed Washington journalists are making this assertion; an American delegation has been visiting South Asia to discuss nuclear matters and snoop into Pakistan's nuclear capability; and the US government is expediting sale of advanced technology to India. Some of this technology has defense applications. Islamabad has always relied for its defense on superior quality in a smaller number of weapons than India deploys. Should New Delhi begin deploying weapons of a quality equal to Islamabad's, in numbers far superior to what Pakistan can hope to achieve, Pakistan will be required to rethink its most basic concepts of survival. Islamabad has supported Washington faithfully, but has received nothing of lasting value in return. It is time for Islamabad to pursue peaceful relations with India and the Soviet Union. Eventually the US will demand adoption of this policy, and Pakistan will be unable to defend itself without American assistance. It would be better to adopt this policy now, at Islamabad's own convenience, than to do so later and give the appearance of capitulation to American pressure.

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"Uranium and Thorium Found in India." Muslim, (Islamabad), 5 November 1985, p. 1.

Scientists exploring on behalf of the Indian Government have located the atomic elements uranium and thorium in the northeastern state of Meghalaya. Secondary uranium minerals have been found in the Anek area, 23 km outside the town of Tura, while both thorium and uranium have been found in the Nenkhara area 65 km from Tura.

"US Assured Computers Not for Nuclear War." Hindu, (Madras), 31 August 1985, p. 1.

India and the US have arrived at an agreement by which India may import sophisticated American computers; discussions took several months due to American concerns that the computers could be used for nuclear weapons. The agreement had originally been scheduled for signing in November 1984 when the US Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldridge was visiting India, but the nuclear clauses were not agreed upon in time. New Delhi was prepared to give assurances that the computers would not be used for nuclear weapons, but the US insisted on a blanket assurance that the computers would not be used for any nuclear purposes, and refused to differentiate between military and non-military uses because India had exploded its own nuclear device. The final language stated that the computers would not be used for any nuclear purposes inconsistent with US laws on the subject.

"Zia Proposes South Asia Meet on Nuclear Issue." Muslim, (Islamabad), 24 October 1985, p. 1.

Speaking at the 40th anniversary session of the UN General Assembly, Pakistan's President Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq said on 23 October that Pakistan and India should reassure each other that they will not use nuclear energy for destructive purposes. Zia reiterated his five-point proposal that the two countries should simultaneously sign the NPT, at the same time accepting the full scope of

safeguards by the IAEA. The two nations should accept mutual inspection of each other's nuclear facilities, issue a joint renunciation of the acquisiton or development of nuclear weapons, and finally agree to the establishment in South Asia of a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone. Zia also called for a regional conference on the development of nuclear energy in South Asia.

"Zia, Rajiv Agree on Need for Talks on N[uclear] Matters." Muslim, (Islamabad), 24 October 1985, p. 1.

Rajiv Gandhi, Prime Minister of India, and Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq, President of Pakistan, held a cordial 40-minute meeting in New York, where both were attending the 40th anniversary of the United Nations General Assembly. Gandhi expressed concern about Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, and the two leaders agreed on the need for bilateral technical discussions on nuclear matters.

2. TACTICS AND ORGANIZATION OF AFGHAN RESISTANCE GROUPS

Martin, Michael. Afghanistan: Inside a Rebel Stronghold, Poole, Dorset (UK): Blandford Press, 1985. 256 pp. DS371.1.M375 1984

The author travelled behind Afghan resistance lines for four months in 1983. Under the sponsorship of the fundamentalist Hezb-Islami of Gulbaddin Hekmatyar, a group generally avoided by Western journalists, he toured the eastern part of the country from the war-ravaged villages near Kabul to the more tranquil Bamyan Valley. He notes that the force of Islam is the backbone of the anticommunist resistance, but that the insurgent groups expend considerable effort feuding and exacting vengeance upon one another. He illustrates the surreal aspects of the conflict through the juxtaposition of traditional Afghan mores with the lethality of modern warfare: the author and his insurgent hosts, for instance, eat a meal insouciantly while bullets chip away the building they occupy. In another example, an 80-year-old Afghan patriarch, offers to join the jihad against the Soviet-dominated regime to replace his son, who has just been killed in action. In depicting the indominability and stubborn resistance of the Afghan insurgents, Martin's account is among the best available today.